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This volume is a remarkably interesting and effective treatment of some 
elements of public enterprise. 
As a report of a conference held by the International Economic Asso- 
ciation, it treats public enterprise in a variety of settings and forms, ranging 
from Electricite de France to garbage collection in the United States and 
kibbutzim in Israel. Practical issues of pricing and finance are mixed with 
theoretical discussions of incentives, planning, and growth. Like other con- 
ferences on the subject, it brings together academics and public-firm man- 
agers to share their lessons. In this case, both groups have important new 
ideas. Moreover the coverage is so varied that the volume offers more than 
just a sample of recent case studies. And William Baumol as editor has 
provided consistency in the level of the chapters. 
I will first comment on the general message of the book and then deal 
with several chapters. Altogether the book continues the trend toward fo- 
cusing on behavior and guidelines, rather than the fact of public ownership. 
There is little discussion of what makes public lirms public, in contrast to 
my own 1976 volume.’ Here the discussion asks (for whatever public firms 
exist) how they can be made to run better. Established criteria (such as 
developed by Ralph Turvey, Marcel Boiteux, Ronald Meek, and others) are 
not rehearsed. Nor are the “social” elements dissected. Rather the focus is 
on general conditions that may help make performance better. What “pub- 
lic, ” “social,” and “good performance” may mean is taken for granted. 
The conclusions generally fit the established literature: such things as 
competition, the avoidance of excessive size (to avoid scale diseconomies), 
applying incentives for effort, and setting limits on subsidies will promote 
efficiency. Also, unions will resist changes that reduce jobs: therefore policies 
to protect workers from the impacts of losing jobs will promote progress. 
Among all manner of structures, sectors, and historical factors, these con- 
ditions operate consistently. 
Turning to individual chapters, I will consider first those that find poor 
’ William G. Shepherd and Associates, Public Enterprise: Economic Analysis of Theory and 
Practice. Lexington, Mass.: Heath-Lexington Books, 1976. 
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performance of public firms. Richard Pryke is most notable, switching from 
the praise in his 197 1 book for U. K. public firms during 1948-1968 to a 
scathing critique of achievements since 1968. Yet he attacks the treatment 
of the firms from the outside, not their inherent nature: U. K. governments 
did too much ad hoc intervention in prices and wages, gave too generous 
subsidies, and appointed mediocre managers; unions were obstructive. With 
better guidance, constraints, managerial quality, and labor flexibility, the 
enterprises might have performed much better. 
E. S. Savas finds that private contracting of garbage removal functions 
is more efficient than public systems. But here again the fault lies in specific 
conditions: monopoly and a lack of proper incentives. William Vickrey 
points out inefficient pricing of several kinds of services, urging a closer 
reliance on marginal costs and individual incentives. 
Turning to favorable evaluations, we find Marcel Boiteux praising the 
considerable achievements of EDF and V. A. Marsan saying that IRI in 
Italy has performed better than is commonly recognized. H. K. Schneider 
and W. Schulz regard the highly variegated arrangements in West Ger- 
many’s electric and gas sector as delivering good performance. Partial com- 
petition has worked by rewarding managers for seeking out efficient outputs 
and prices. And Haim Barkai finds good performance in kibbutzim arising 
from their inner cohesion and outer stresses. Other chapters, too, offer much 
fascinating experience, nearly all conforming to the general lessons. 
The book therefore reafhrms the practical consensus that public enterprise 
permits good performance if the constraints and incentives applied to it are 
correct. The biggest failures come from outside, when government policies 
undermine public firms or lead them astray in predictable directions. Public 
enterprise is seen as a simple process or substance that responds routinely 
to limits. Indeed here, as elsewhere, one reads that public firms behave much 
the same as do private firms; publicness does not much matter, while the 
constraints are decisive. 
This consensus view is cautious and attractive, but it needs to be enriched 
with a clearer articulation of publicness and of the social goals served by 
the &ms. Even Dr. Baumol’s perceptive summary can provide only the 
practical lessons for sensible observers: avoid monopoly, apply financial 
penalties where appropriate, and improve pricing rules. This volume is a 
valuable summary of experience, but there is still room for much work in 
defining what public firms are and what their performance ought to be. 
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